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The Jury Trial in Antitrust Cases:
An Anachronism?
Edward D. Cavanaght
Introduction
The Seventh Amendment of the United States Constitution provides
in relevant part that "[i]n suits at common law, where the value in
controversy exceeds twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved."' The jury trial has long been the foundation of the American
civil justice system and is deeply embedded in American culture.2 As
the Supreme Court has observed, "[m]aintenance of the jury as a fact-
finding body is of such importance and occupies so firm a place in our
history and jurisprudence that any seeming curtailment of the right to a
jury trial should be scrutinized with the utmost care."3 Consistent with
' A.B. (1971), University ofNotre Dame; J.D. (1974), Cornell Law School; LL.M.
(1986), J.S.D. (1989), Columbia Law School. Edward D. Cavanagh is a Professor of
Law at St. John's University School of Law.
'U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
2 See Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59, 65 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
(citing 5 JAMES WM. MOORE, ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE §38.02 (2d ed.
1977)) ("The jury is like rock music. Classical theory frowns; the masses applaud. And
in a democracy the felt need of the masses has a claim upon the law."); see also In re
U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411, 419-20 (9th Cir. 1979) ("The right to jury trial
arrived on the shores of this country with the first English colonists. The original
Jamestown charter guaranteed all the rights of Englishmen to the colonizers, including
trial by jury. During the next two hundred years of development in colonial America,
the right to jury trial continued to expand. The principles embodied injury trials found
a receptive atmosphere in the egalitarian principles of the colonists. By 1776, the right
to jury trial existed, in one form or another, in each one of the thirteen colonies. In
fact, one of the primary grievances against England at the time of the Declaration of
Independence was the restriction on the right to jury trial. Colonial administrators had
been circumventing the right by trying various cases, both criminal and civil, in the
vice-admiralty courts.").
3Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474,486 (1935); see also Jacob v. City ofNew York,
315 U.S. 752, 752-53 (1942) ("The right of jury trial in civil cases at common law is
a basic and fundamental feature of our system of federal jurisprudence which is
protected by the Seventh Amendment. A right so fundamental and sacred to the
citizen, whether guaranteed by the Constitution or provided by statute, should be
jealously guarded by the courts.").
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that approach, the Court has construed the Seventh Amendment broadly
to protect the right to jury trial.4
Nevertheless, "[tihe surface simplicity of [the Seventh Amendment]
is beguiling for the exact scope of its application was unclear even when
it was first adopted."5 Applying the so-called historical test,6 courts have
upheld the right to jury trial when the issue in question is essentially legal
in nature, irrespective of whether the right in question existed at the time
the Seventh Amendment was adopted.7 Notwithstanding the popular
reverence for the jury system and the Supreme Court's expansive view
of the Seventh Amendment, the use of lay jurors to decide complicated
fact issues in antitrust cases, as well as in other types of cases, has come
under criticism, notably from the judiciary
The attack on the use ofjuries in antitrust cases has proceeded in two
distinct phases. Phase one took place in the 1970s, a time that roughly
coincides with the federal judiciary's embrace of the Chicago School
' See, e.g., Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 479 (1962) (finding that
where the issue involves money damages and is clearly legal in nature, the court is not
bound by a party's characterization of its claim as equitable); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v.
Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510 (1959) (finding the fact that the plaintiffs claim is
equitable in nature cannot preempt defendant's right to a jury trial on its antitrust
counterclaim).
5In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411, 421 (9th Cir. 1979).
6Id.; see infra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
7In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d at 421 (citing Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. 433,
446-447 (1830)).
'See ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423, 447-48 (N.D.
Cal. 1978) ("Throughout the trial, the court felt that the jury was having trouble
grasping the concepts that were being discussed by the expert witnesses, most of whom
had doctorate degrees in their specialties. This perception was confirmed when the
court questioned the jurors during the course of their deliberations and after they were
discharged. When asked by the court whether a case of this type should be tried to ajury, the foreman of the jury said, 'If you can find a jury that's both a computer
technician, a lawyer, an economist, knows all about that stuff, yes, I think you could
have a qualified jury, but we don't know anything about that.' Several of the otherjurors indicated that they thought that the major stumbling block was the requirement
that the verdict be unanimous. When they were questioned after the trial, most of thejurors indicated that they thought a complex antitrust case like this one should be tried
to the court.") (citation omitted); see generally Peter W. Sperlich, The Case for
Preserving Trial by Jury in Complex Civil Litigation, 65 JUDICATURE 394, 397 n.2(1982) (citing speeches and articles by then Chief Justice Warren Burger that detail his
"rather modest enthusiasm for trial by jury" because "the jury system does not work
and, in any case, we cannot afford it").
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revolution in antitrust thinking.9 Phase one featured a full-frontal assault
on the right to a jury trial. In antitrust cases where a jury trial had been
demanded, defendants seeking a bench trial moved to strike the jury
demand on the grounds that the matter was too complicated for a lay jury
to decide, thus invoking the so-called complexity exception to the
Seventh Amendment.'" Although some trial-level courts have embraced
this approach," the Ninth Circuit categorically rejected the complexity
exception.'2 Only the Third Circuit has accepted it.'3 The Supreme Court
has not weighed in on the issue, but the overall trend in federal courts has
been to expand-not limit-the right to a jury trial.'4 By 1988, the
complexity exception seemed dead in the water.
Phase two is a more recent phenomenon in which the use of lay juries
in private treble damage actions has come under increasingly sharp
attacks from antitrust scholars. The focus of the academic criticism is
practical rather than theoretical or legalistic. 5 Academic critics of the
traditional jury system contend that the lay jury is ill-suited to resolve
factual disputes arising in ever-more technical and complicated twenty-
first century market settings. Among other things, critics contend that
antitrust issues are beyond the ken of the average juror and that "juries
misunderstand essential economic concepts, fail to comprehend their
instructions, and make decisions based on fairness intuitions that are
irrelevant in antitrust analysis."' 6 Some see jurors as inherently biased
in favor of the little guy in what they view as a David versus Goliath
9 See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc., v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 53 n.21
(1977); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477, 481 n.4 (1977).
oIn re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1088 (3d Cir. 1980).
"See, e.g., ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp. 458 F. Supp. 423, 444-49
(N.D. Cal. 1978), aff'd sub nom. Memorex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 636 F.2d 1188 (9th
Cir. 1980); Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, 79 F.R.D. 59, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d at 423.
13 See In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d at 1088.
14 See Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
"5 See, e.g., HERBERT HovENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND
ExECUTION 63 (2005); Daniel Crane, Antitrust Antifederalism, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1, 38
(2008); Donald F. Turner, The Durability, Relevance, and Future ofAmerican Antitrust
Policy, 75 CAL. L. REV. 797 (1987).
16 Crane, supra note 15, at 35.
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lawsuit.'7 Former Harvard Law School Professor and Antitrust Division
head Donald Turner has stated, "There would be significant gains from
eliminating jury trials from private antitrust actions."18 Similarly, Uni-
versity of Iowa Law Professor Herbert Hovenkamp has stated that "[j]ury
trials are a truly unfortunate way to decide most of the contested issues
in complex antitrust cases" and has described antitrustjuries as "the weak
link in a system where most of the relevant evidence is economic and
technical."' 9
Critics of the jury system point out that among other nations with
antitrust regimes, the United States stands virtually alone in utilizing lay
jurors as fact finders in antitrust cases involving complex economic
evidence, suggesting that the United States is out of step with the rest of
the world." Critics further observe that curtailing the right to a jury
would not likely adversely affect antitrust litigation because as a practical
matter, jury participation in resolving antitrust disputes is severely
limited.2' Most public antitrust enforcement actions in the United States
do not involvejuries. For example, many actions brought by the Antitrust
Division under section 2 of the Sherman Act and Section 7 of the Clayton
Act seek equitable remedies to which the right to a jury does not attach.
Likewise, many, if not most, antitrust criminal cases are resolved prior
to trial.12 The same is true for public civil enforcement actions. Further-
more, there is no right to a jury trial in Federal Trade Commission
enforcement actions, which are typically handled administratively.
Critics argue that lay juries are simply not up to the task of resolving
highly complex disputes regarding ever-evolving technology settings. 3
17 See Barbara S. Swain & Dan R. Gallipeau, What They Bring to Court: Juror
Attitudes in Antitrust Cases, 8 ANTITRUST 14 (1994) ("Many jurors walk into antitrust
cases with a jaundiced eye toward a large corporate defendant.").
18 Turner, supra note 15, at 812 (stating the "elimination ofjuries would increase
the probability of accurate results").
19 HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, at 63.
20 id.
21 Crane, supra note 15, at 35 (observing that "only a small fraction of [private]
cases ever find their way to a jury").
22 id.
23 See William Watkins, We Need a Specialized Patent Trial Court, LAw 360, Oct.
20,2014, http://www.law360.com/articles/583409/we-need-a-specialized-patent-trial-
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For them, getting the "right" answers is more important than the fact-
finding process; technocracy trumps democracy. However, this distrust
of juries is not universal. Not everyone disparages the abilities of lay
jurors. Just as antitrust defendants seek to avoid juries, antitrust plaintiffs
generally welcome juries as fact finders.
Although the Supreme Court has stayed out of the debate over the
existence of a complexity exception to the Seventh Amendment, it has
not been unsympathetic to concerns about the competence of lay juries.
The Court has frozen juries out of the decision-making process in private
antitrust cases in other ways, including (1) granting motions to dismiss,
(2) granting summaryjudgment motions, (3) excluding or limiting expert
testimony under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. ,24 and
(4) denying class certification motions. Indeed, the Supreme Court has
observed that antitrust cases may be too complicated for judges, and a
fortiori juries, thus leading to erroneous outcomes that may serve to
hinder, rather than to promote, competition.25 In Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 26 the Court endorsed the motion to dismiss as a cost contain-
ment tool to police insubstantial private treble damages actions, exhorting
trial judges to carefully screen antitrust complaints at the motion to
dismiss stage in order to avoid waste of court and private resources.27
This judicial response-finding procedural vehicles to dispose of
private suits pretrial, coupled with the fact that defendants, not plaintiffs,
want to avoid juries in private antitrust actions-is very telling and
strongly suggests that criticisms of the jury system are, in reality, attacks
on the private right of action in antitrust cases itself. However, the
question of whether there should be a private right of action is not up to
the courts; Congress has already made that decision.28
court ("For jurors serving in patent trials, courts could require the jurors to possess a
formal education in the sciences or technology-and in some cases specialized
knowledge in the particular field related to the patent.").
24 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
25 Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
414 (2004).
26 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
27 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559.
28 See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964) (creating a private right of action for those aggrieved
by antitrust violations).
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This Article argues the complexity exception is inherently flawed and
that the jury system, although by no means perfect, remains the best
vehicle for resolving disputes in antitrust cases brought in the federal
courts, however complex. First, antitrust issues may well be complicated
and difficult to resolve, but they are not beyond the ken ofjurors. In our
adversarial system, attorneys and their clients have the responsibility of
making their cases understandable to lay jurors. 9 As more fully dis-
cussed below,3" courts have a variety of tools and mechanisms to ease
the task of jurors. Critics of the lay jury denounce the system, but they
never come forward with a viable alternative to the jury trial. After all,
criticisms leveled at lay jurors would seem to apply with equal force to
generalist judges-the only real alternative to the jury.31
Second, in encouraging trial courts to dispose of private antitrust suits
earlier and earlier on the litigation timeline, the Supreme Court may be
thwarting a fundamental goal of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that
meritorious litigants should have their day in court.32 Worse, the litiga-
tion model being shaped by the Supreme Court is strikingly similar to
the common law model, which was designed to avoid trial altogether and
which the drafters of the Federal Rules pointedly rejected.33
Third, and often overlooked in the debate over the merits ofjuries in
antitrust cases, is that having antitrust disputes resolved by juries
consisting of ordinary citizens promotes democratic values and lends
legitimacy to the judiciary's function of resolving legal disputes among
citizens.34
29 See John F. Grady, Trial Management and Jury Control in Antitrust Cases, 51
ANTITRUST 249, 251 (1982) (providing tips for guiding ajury in understanding crucial
facts).
30 See infra notes 208-30 and accompanying text.
31 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Monopolization: Past, Present, Future, 61 ANTITRUST
99, 109 (1992) (asserting a generalist judge can better grasp antitrust issues thanjurors,
but is still relatively ignorant in complex matters such as antitrust questions).
32 See FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
33See Edward D. Cavanagh, Federal CivilLitigation at the Crossroads: Reshaping
the Role of the Federal Courts in Twenty-First Century Dispute Resolution, 93 OR. L.
REV. 631, 636 (2015) ("[C]ommon law procedures were complicated and difficult to
navigate, and.., one misstep could lead to dismissal with prejudice. ... The Federal
Rules eliminated the land mines from the litigation landscape so as to facilitate trial.").
" Among other things, the jury verdict "provides a needed check on judicial
power." Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 478 F. Supp. 889, 942
(E.D. Pa. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 631 F. 2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980). In addition,
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I. The Right to a Jury Trial in Antitrust Actions
A. Evolution of the Law
The Supreme Court has never directly addressed the question of
whether the source of the right to ajury trial in antitrust cases is constitu-
tional or statutory. Despite some "tantalizing language" in earlier
Supreme Court decisions suggesting that the right to a jury in antitrust
matters is statutory in nature, the lower courts have uniformly held that
"no right to jury trial flows directly from the antitrust laws."35 Accord-
ingly, the right to a jury trial in antitrust cases is rooted in the Constitu-
tion.
Interestingly, the Seventh Amendment does not confer the right to a
jury. Rather, it provides that "[i]n [s]uits at common law ... the right
of trial by jury shall be preserved."36 A narrow reading of this language
would suggest that, unless there was a right to jury trial in 1791-the year
the Seventh Amendment took effect-no such right would exist today.
Courts have rejected this view as unduly narrow and instead adopted the
historical test.3 7 This entails a two-step inquiry: (1) whether the issues
to be tried are legal in nature or analogous to legal issues; and (2) whether
the action was of the type that juries tried at common law.38 Antitrust
damage claims, which are sometimes described as statutory torts,39 are
the jury ruling offers the judiciary a "contemporaneous expression of community
values that bear on the issues in each case." Ernest Higginbotham, Continuing the
Dialogue: Civil Juries and the Allocation of Judicial Power, 56 TEX. L. REv. 47, 58
(1977).
" Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. Arizona, 738 F.2d 1021, 1.025 (9th Cir. 1984).
36 U.S. CONST. amend. VII (emphasis added).
17 See In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411, 421-23 (9th Cir. 1979) (noting that
"courts are not rigidly bound to the procedural rules and forms of action as they existed
in 1791" and that "the historical test is not static"); see also Standard Oil Co. of Cal.,
738 F.2d at 1028-31 (upholding the right to jury trial in an action by a state parens
patriae).
38 Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 738 F.2d at 1027; see also Dimickv. Schiedt, 293 U.S.
474, 476 (1935) ("In order to ascertain the scope and meaning of the Seventh
Amendment, resort must be had to the appropriate rules ofthe common law established
at the time of the adoption of that constitutional provision in 1791.").
" See Am. Soc'y of Mech. Eng'rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 565-69
(1982); Grip-Pak, Inc. v. Ill. Tool Workers, Inc., 694 F.2d 466, 473 (7th Cir. 1982).
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clearly legal actions and qualify for trial by jury under the historical test.
The result has been a broad expansion of the constitutional right to ajury
trial in antitrust actions as well as other federally based claims. In Beacon
Theatres v. Westover,40 an outdoor theatre operator challenged the
exclusive licenses granted by film distributors to theatres operated by
Fox, a rival exhibitor.41 Fox initiated a declaratory judgment action
against Beacon Theatres seeking a declaration that its exclusive licenses
were lawful. 42 Beacon then counterclaimed, alleging a violation of
section one of the Sherman Act, and demanded a jury trial. 43 The trial
court denied the request for a jury, ruling that the issues were basically
equitable in nature.4 The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that, when read
as a whole, Fox's complaint stated a claim for equitable relief.45 The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that neither the Declaratory Judgment
Act nor the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure can justify denial of a jury
trial on antitrust issues." The Court recognized that where the facts give
rise to both equitable and legal claims, the trial court will necessarily have
some discretion in deciding which issue to try first; however, in accor-
dance with the Seventh Amendment, "discretion is very narrowly limited
and must, wherever possible, be exercised to preserve jury trial. 4 7
Accordingly, the existence of equitable issues cannot preempt the right
to a jury trial on legal issues.
Notwithstanding the sweeping language of Beacon Theatres favoring
jury trials, critics ofjury trials in treble damages actions continue to argue
that the right to a jury trial in antitrust cases is not absolute and should
be curtailed where complex factual issues are beyond the ability of lay
jurors to comprehend.48
40 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
4' Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 502.
42 id.
41 Id. at 503.
44Id.
45 Id. at 504-05.
41 Id. at 508-09.
47 Id. at 510.
48Thomas M. Jorde, The Seventh AmendmentRight to Jury Trial ofAntitrust Issues,
69 CAL. L. REV. 1, 5 (1981).
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B. Critics Have Not Made the Case
for a Complexity Exception
Given the constitutional underpinnings of the right to a jury trial in
civil cases, the Supreme Court's historical support of that right, the trans-
substantive nature of federal procedural rules and the popular reverence
for juries, proponents of the complexity exception face a heavy burden
of proof. They have not made their case. The theoretical basis for any
complexity exception is weak. There are three arguments that have been
put forward to support this so-called complexity exception. First, at
common law, complex cases were typically referred to the equity courts
where no right to a jury trial existed.49 Second, the Supreme Court in
Ross v. Bernhard'0 limited the right to a jury trial, stating in a footnote
that one factor in determining the legal nature of a claim (and hence the
right to ajury trial) is "the practical abilities and limitations ofjuries."'5
Third, where the facts are so complicated that the jury cannot render a
rational verdict, utilizing the jury as fact-finder would violate the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment." Courts have uniformly rejected
the first argument.53 The second argument based on the Ross footnote
has gotten some traction in the lower courts.54 Ultimately, however, that
argument has not won over the courts. If the Supreme Court had intended
to articulate a major limitation on the right to a jury trial-after years of
expanding that right-it is most unlikely that this limitation would have
been buried in a footnote with no explanation whatsoever and no citation
to prior authority.55 Moreover, in the years since Ross, the Supreme Court
has not relied on that decision to any significant extent to limit the right
49 d.
50 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
"' Ross, 396 U.S. at 538 n.10.
521In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1088 (3d Cir. 1980).
531 Id. at 1083.
14 See, e.g., In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litig., 420 F. Supp. 99, 104 (W.D. Wash.
1976); Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59, 66-67 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); see
also Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 478 F. Supp. 889, 926 (E.D.
Pa. 1979), rev'don other grounds, 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980) (citing cases that have
supported use of Ross factors when determining Seventh Amendment questions).
" Zenith, 478 F. Supp. at 926.
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to a jury trial in civil cases.56 In any event, having upheld the jury
demand, the Court was clearly not concerned that the Ross case itself was
beyond the ken of jurors; therefore the footnote is, at best, mere dicta.57
More likely, the language in the Ross footnote simply "refers to the
established exception to the Seventh Amendment in administrative
proceedings and specialized courts of equity."58
The third argument based on due process is the most challenging. The
contention that a verdict based on complex facts that the jury did not
understand is irrational and cannot stand as a matter of law has visceral
appeal. In the end, however, the due process argument is fundamentally
flawed and unpersuasive. As a threshold matter, it is questionable that
Fifth Amendment rights would so easily displace Seventh Amendment
rights. The Fifth Amendment prohibits the federal government from
interfering with a citizen's life, liberty, or property without due process
of law.59 A litigant would suffer loss of property only after a supposedly
incompetent jury has rendered a verdict that is arbitrary.6" At the time
a jury is demanded or empaneled, any injury to the litigant is merely
speculative.61 Depending on how the jury decides, the litigant may have
no claim; it is impossible to predict when a jury will be unable to
understand the issues and act arbitrarily. In any event, the aggrieved
litigant has ample weapons with which to attack an arbitrary verdict.
Moreover, the Due Process clause does not entitle a litigant to a jury
of a particular composition or one that is to its liking. Rather, it entitles
them only to ajury that is representative of the community and that does
not systematically exclude identifiable groups from that community.62
56 On the contrary, the Court has emphasized that the Seventh Amendment
"requires a jury trial upon demand, if the statute creates legal rights and remedies,
enforceable in an action for damages in the ordinary courts of law." Curtis v. Loether,
415 U.S. 189, 194 (1974).
17 See In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411, 432 (9th Cir. 1979) (declining to
"read the Ross footnote as establishing a new interpretation of the Seventh
Amendment").
58 Zenith, 478 F. Supp. at 930.
59 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
60 Sperlich, supra note 8, at 411.
6 1 1d.
62 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86 (1986) (noting intentional racial
discrimination in jury selection improperly deprives the defendant of a trial by his or
her peers).
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In our adversary system, counsel's job is to present a case that puts
its client's best foot forward. Critical to the success of that task is
presentation of the evidence in a way that the fact finder can understand.63
If counsel cannot do that, it has failed in its basic mission. It is no answer
for counsel to say that the proof was there, but the jury was simply too
incompetent to comprehend it. This is not to say that antitrust issues are
not complicated; many such issues are, indeed, complicated. Neverthe-
less, counsel must find a way to present the facts to the jury in digestible
doses. As more fully discussed below, 64 there are a variety of practices
and procedures that the court and counsel can invoke to make the facts
comprehensible to a lay jury. In the end, the complexity argument is
more an excuse for failure to win a case than a reason to disqualify the
layjury. Furthermore, proponents of the complexity argument have left
many questions unanswered. Assuming, arguendo, that some antitrust
cases are too complex for a jury to decide, who should serve as the fact
finder? The default answer, of course, is the judge. But, is the judge
really a better-it is clearly the only-alternative to the jury? The same
logic that leads to the conclusion that antitrust issues are too complex for
lay jurors would seem to apply equally to generalist judges. 65 In other
words, if antitrust issues are too complicated for a lay jury, then these
same issues are probably too complicated for generalist judges. Indeed
Judge Easterbrook argues forcefully that judges are no better equipped
to decide complex antitrust issues than lay jurors:
[W]e commit the resolution of tough [antitrust] questions to amateurs. Jurors
are amateurs, and so are judges. Judges are generalists. At a ratio of fifty
cocaine cases to ten securities cases to five pension cases to two tax cases
to one antitrust case, how is a judge to stay on top of this field? This is
roughly the ratio for the last term at my court. And don't forget the civil
rights, torts, and contracts cases. Acquiring and assessing information is
easier for a judge who visits the subject occasionally than for a juror who
visits it once in a lifetime, but ajudge is still a dunce compared with the most
junior professor of business at a third-rate college.66
63 See generally Grady, supra note 29, at 253-58 (detailing ways in which counsel
can make a complicated case understandable to a lay juror).
64 See infra notes 208-32 and accompanying text.
65 Easterbrook, supra note 31, at 109.
66 id.
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Similarly, Judge Higginbotham has argued thatjudges are not necessarily
superior fact finders to juries in complex antitrust cases: "Apart from the
occasional situation in which a judge possesses unique training.., the
assumption that a jury collectively has less ability to comprehend
complex material than does a single judge is an unjustified conclusion."6
Professor Hovenkamp, on the other hand, has argued that the judge
is a better choice than the jury in complex cases.6" Oversimplifying the
role of the jury, he reduces the jury's fact-finding function to two areas:
(1) determining subjective intent and (2) choosing among dueling expert
witnesses.69 First, Hovenkamp argues that jurors have difficulty dis-
tinguishing between lawful aggressive competitive intent and unlawful
anticompetitive intent." He observes that jurors often misinterpret the
"rhetoric of competition"--we must destroy or kill the competition-and
penalize industrious companies who are simply seeking to outsell their
rivals.7' Hovenkamp suggests that judges, unlike juries, can distinguish
between lawful aggressive competitive intent and unlawful exclusionary
intent and are able to ignore such intent distinctions when irrelevant.72
At the same time, he acknowledges that judges do allow juries to hear
proof of subjective intent as evidence of unlawful exclusionary
behavior.73
Hovenkamp's observations may well be correct, but his solution-
eliminate the jury-seems extreme. A principal function of the trial judge
is to exclude from the jury evidence that is inadmissible. If the court
permits the jury to entertain inadmissible evidence, its judgrnent is subject
to review and reversal in an appellate forum. The jury can hardly be
blamed if it considers evidence that the court permits to slip through the
67 Higginbotham, supra note 34, at 53; see also DOROTHY K. KAGEHIRO &
WILLIAM S. LAUFER, HANDBOOK OF THE PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW 89 (1992) ("Because
of this lack of confidence in juries, judges are often favored as the fact finder. How-
ever, judges may be in no better position than juries to adequately understand much of
the technical information that arises in complex cases. Although better educated than
the average juror, judges are not likely to be trained in specific technical areas.").
68 HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, at 61-62.
69 id.
" Id. at 61.
71 id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
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evidentiary screen. Often, evidence of subjective intent maybe admitted
into evidence for purposes other than establishing unlawful exclusionary
conduct. In those cases, it is incumbent on the court to instruct the jury
that it may not use evidence of aggressive competitive intent to establish
unlawful exclusionary conduct.
With respect to dueling experts, Hovenkamp is concerned that the lay
jury will be adrift in a sea of confusion and will "base[] its decision on
such things as rhetorical skills, personalities or the expert's rate of pay."74
He points out that, although in theory a lay person could learn over time
how to effectively evaluate expert testimony, for most people jury service
is a once in a lifetime endeavor; realistically, there will not be subsequent
opportunities for jurors to hone their fact finding skills.75 The judge, on
the other hand, does have the opportunity to evaluate expert evidence in
case after case, thereby giving the court a comparative advantage in this
endeavor.76
This comparative advantage for the judge, however, does not appear
to be significant. Hovenkamp acknowledges that even judges may have
difficulty choosing among contending experts and "often the question
is given to the jury because the judge did not know how to answer it and
therefore declined to rule at an earlier stage of the litigation."77 At the
end of the day, Hovenkamp's observations on jury performance in
antitrust cases are interesting, but at most show that antitrust issues may
pose a challenge for any fact finder-whether judge or jury-and not
compelling evidence of the need to jettison juries in complex antitrust
cases. This is not to suggest that the judge has no fact-finding role, even
where ajury is empaneled. Traditionally, the roles ofjudge andjury have
been sharply defined: the judge decides the legal issues; and the jury
decides the facts. In practice, however, the line demarcating law from
facts is not as bright as might appear at first blush. The Supreme Court
observed in Pullman-Standard v. Swint:78 "The Court has previously
noted the vexing nature of the distinction between questions of fact and
74 Id. at 61-62.
751 Id. at 62.
76 id.
77 Id.
7 456 U.S. 273 (1982).
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questions of law. .... Nor do we yet know of any... rule or principle
that will unerringly distinguish a factual finding from a legal con-
clusion."79
The quintessential fact question involves events or occurrences, so-
called historical facts. Notice, intent, and state of mind are common
illustrations of historical facts established by inference. Law, on the other
hand, "means a body of principles and rules which are capable of being
predicated in advance and which are so predicated, awaiting proof of the
facts necessary for their application."8 Between the two poles of "pure
question of fact" and "pure questions of law" lies a significant middle
ground of mixed questions of law and fact, sometimes referred to as
questions of ultimate fact. Ultimate facts differ from pure questions of
fact in that they are typically outcome determinative facts, derived from
historical facts that imply application of a legal standard.8 ' Ultimate facts
are also distinct "from pure legal conclusions, which follow necessarily
from proof of historical facts."82 Whether a case is barred by resjudicata
or a statute of limitations or whether there is sufficient standing or
jurisdiction are examples of legal conclusions that follow from proof of
certain historical facts.83
Mixed questions have varying degrees of factual content. Where the
factual content is relatively high and the law content relatively low, the
mixed question is decided by the jury.84 Thus, issues ofproximate cause,
due care, timeliness, and notice are typically referred to juries.85 The
unifying feature of these issues is that they involve facts that operate on
examination or assessment of human behavior, and therefore, precisely
the kinds of questions that are tailor-made for juries.86 Decisions turn
Pullman Standard, 456 U.S. at 288 (citation omitted).80Francis H. Bohlen, Mixed Questions ofLaw andFact, 72 U. PA. L. REV. 111, 112
(1924).
81 William W. Schwarzer, Summary Judgment Under the Federal Rules: Defining
Genuine Issues of Material Fact, 99 F.R.D. 465, 470 (1983).
82 1d.
83 id.
84 Id. at 471.
" Id. at 471-72.
86 See id. at 472 (noting twelve people have greater knowledge of the "common
affairs of life" than does a single person).
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on the facts of the particular case and there is no need for uniform or
expected outcomes.87
The situation is different where the law content of the mixed question
is relatively high. Examples include issues involving whether a publica-
tion is copyrightable, whether securities law considers a control person
to have acted in good faith, and whether the victim of an alleged
defamatory statement is a public figure.88 Judges typically decide these
types of issues because consistency and predictability are essential.89
Professor Jorde has persuasively argued that the well-recognized right
to a jury trial in antitrust cases does not preclude the court from a fact-
finding role.9" Put another way, the Seventh Amendment right to a jury
trial does not guarantee that all issues in the case will be decided by the
jury. Jorde points out that certain recurring issues in antitrust cases
involving conduct and damages have deep roots in common law
jurisprudence and therefore are appropriate for the jury.91 Other antitrust
issues, notably those involving market structure and economic analysis,
have no analogue at common law; therefore, no constitutional right to
a jury trial attaches on those issues.92 Accordingly, the court may itself
decide facts relating to market structure issue but refer issues relating to
conduct and damages to the jury.
The Supreme Court's later decision in Markman v. Westview Instru-
ments, Inc.93 is consistent with the Jorde approach. Markman was a
patent infringement matter in which the Supreme Court ruled that,
notwithstanding the right to ajury trial in patent cases, issues concerning
the scope or construction of the patent are for the court because judges
are "better suited to find the acquired meaning of patent terms. '94 In so
87 id.
81 Id. at 472-73.
89 Id. at 473.
90 Jorde, supra note 48, at 36.
91 Id. at 53.
92 Id. at 66 ("[W]hile the Seventh Amendment preserves jury trial of conduct and
damage issues it does not preserve jury trial for market structure issues because none
were tried by juries in England in 1791.").
93 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
94Markman, 517 U.S. at 388.
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holding, the Court was careful to point out that it reached its conclusion
only after a review of history yielded no definitive guidance on whether
questions regarding the scope or construction of patents are for the judge
or jury.95 Accordingly, Markman cannot be read as supporting the
complexity exception or as a retreat from earlier opinions favoring jury
trials.96
As noted above, in antitrust practice, motions to strike jury demands
are almost exclusively made by defendants, not plaintiffs. Ifjuries were
truly an obstacle to achieving valid outcomes in antitrust cases, one would
expect more of a consensus on this issue and would expect to see
plaintiffs, as well as defendants, challenging the utilization of the jury
as the fact finder. Furthermore, it is anomalous that those who would
eliminate juries in private antitrust actions also contend that antitrust
enforcement is principally designed to protect consumers. Yet, they
would exclude consumers-the very people that the antitrust laws are
meant to benefit-from the decision-making process.
C. The Courts and the Complexity Issue
Although the federal courts have largely balked at both the notion that
antitrust cases are so inherently complex that the factual issues raised
therein are beyond the comprehension ofjurors and at the argument that
certain antitrust cases are so complex that juries cannot reach reasoned
verdicts, the federal judiciary has not been insensitive to, or unconcerned
about, the practical problems surrounding resolution of complex factual
issues in antitrust cases. To the contrary, the courts have addressed
complexity concerns, using a variety of techniques to keep antitrust issues
out of the jury room, including: (1) granting motions to dismiss, (2)
granting summary judgment, (3) limiting or excluding expert testimony
under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. , and (4) denying
class certification.
95 id.
" See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL COURTS § 92 (7th
ed. 2011).
97 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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1. Motions to Dismiss
Courts have kept antitrust cases away from juries by entertaining and
granting motions to dismiss. Although courts have refrained from direct
criticism ofjurors, they have done so indirectly by questioning the ability
of judges to reach good outcomes in antitrust cases.9" In Verizon Com-
munications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko,99 the Supreme Court,
reversing the Second Circuit, ruled that Verizon's motion to dismiss the
complaint should have been granted, noting that even in the best of
circumstances, courts may face difficulty applying the requirements of
section 2 of the Sherman Act because it is "a daunting task for a genera-
list antitrust court" to assess antitrust duties in the highly technical,
complex and fluid telecommunications market."°° The Court's concern
about the complexity of the decision making process is tied to its fear that
judges will make mistakes and wrongly condemn conduct that is pro-
competitive, giving rise to false positives and ultimately hindering, rather
than promoting, competition." 1 Ifjudges are likely to get it wrong, then
so, too, are juries.
In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the sister case of Trinko brought
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, the Court again found that the
plaintiffs' complaint was deficient as a matter law and should have been
dismissed. 1 2 In so ruling, the Court reiterated the themes stated in
Trinko, most prominently the high cost of discovery in complex cases
and the likelihood of false positives if questionable cases are permitted
to proceed to trial."0 3 The Court in Twombly held that under Rule 8, an
antitrust conspiracy claim must plausibly suggest agreement among
defendants, that is, the complaint must plead "enough fact to raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal
" See Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
398, 414 (2004) (asserting that facts involved in anticompetitive conduct are often
"beyond the practical ability of a judicial tribunal to control.").
99 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
100 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 414.
101 Id.
102 550 U.S. 544, 548-49, 553 (2007).
103 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 558.
2016]
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF TRIAL ADVOCACY
agreement., 10 4 Mere possibility of wrongdoing is not enough to pass
muster under Rule 8, "lest a plaintiff with 'a largely groundless claim'
be allowed to 'take up the time of a number of other people, with the right
to do so representing an in terrorem increment of the settlement
value. "l°5 Accordingly, when the complaint fails to allege facts that state
a plausible claim for relief, "this basic deficiency should.. . be exposed
at the point of minimum expenditure of time and money by the parties
and the court," and the complaint then tossed on a motion to dismiss.106
The Court in Twombly assigned districtjudges in the role as gatekeep-
ers, tasked with the job of scrutinizing complaints at the motion to
dismiss stage to assure that infirm antitrust claims do not proceed to
discovery.0 7 In assessing complaints, the trial court must (1) accept all
well-pleaded facts as true, and (2) apply experience and common sense
to determine whether the complaint is plausible." 8 This broad charge
would seem to license the court to make factual decisions at the motion
to dismiss stage that had traditionally been left to the jury after trial.10 9
2. Summary Judgment
Similarly, the courts have used summary judgment as a vehicle to
avoid jury trials in antitrust cases. Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, a moving party is entitled to summary judgment
where it "shows that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."'11 Although Rule 56
is party neutral, summary judgment is quintessentially a defendant's
tool."' Antitrust cases are heavily fact-bound. Rarely, if ever, will a
... Id. at 556.
1o5Id. at 557-58 (quoting Dura Pharms. Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005)).
106 Id. at 558.
I071d at 552, 573.
'08 Ashcroft v. Iqbal 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009) (citing Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d
143, 157-58 (2d. Cir. 2007)).
109 See id. at 682-83 (rejecting the plaintiffs claim in favor of the "obvious
alternative explanation" offered by the Government).
"
0 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
11 See Samuel Issacharoff& George Lowenstein, Second ThoughtsAbout Summary
Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73, 83 (1990) ("By streamlining the production required of
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plaintiff be able to successfully assert that the facts are not in dispute and
that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The plaintiff simply
wants to present its case to a jury; the defendant wants to avoid the jury
altogether. Like motions to dismiss in the wake of Twombly, summary
judgment motions are now routine in antitrust cases.
Although summary judgment has always been part of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and reads substantially the same today as when
it was initially promulgated in 1938, courts were initially reluctant to
invoke this procedure,112 fearing that to do so may deny plaintiffs their
day in court. 1 3 This was particularly true in antitrust cases in the wake
of the Supreme Court's decision in Poller v. CBS, Inc.114 In Poller, the
Court denied defendant's motion for summary judgment, ruling that
"summary procedures should be used sparingly in complex antitrust
litigation where motive and intent play leading roles, the proof is largely
in the hands of the alleged conspirators, and hostile witnesses thicken the
plot."115 Not surprisingly, some courts read Poller as precluding sum-
mary judgment in antitrust cases, even though the Supreme Court
explicitly rejected such a broad reading of Poller six years later in First
National Bank ofArizona v. Cities Service Co. 116
a movant without the ultimate burden ofproof, Celotex facilitates recourse to summary
judgment by defendants," which "completes the shift from summary judgment as a
plaintiff's motion prior to the promulgation of the Federal Rules to a defendant's
motion under Celotex."); Morton Denlow, Summary Judgment: Boon or Burden?, 37
JUDGES' J. 26, 27 (1998) ("Although a plaintiff has equal recourse to summary
judgment under Rule 56, the motion has largely become a defendant's weapon.").
112 See 11 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 56.07 (7th
ed. 1999) (noting a general sense that summary judgment was "limited by judicial
reluctance"); Samuel Issacharoff & George Lowenstein, Second Thoughts About
Summary Judgment, 100 YALEL.J. 73, 77 (1990) ("From its inception, federal judges
treated summary judgment warily, perceiving it as threatening a denial of such
fundamental guarantees as the right to confront witnesses, the right of the jury to make
inferences and determinations of credibility, and the right to have one's cause
advocated by counsel before a jury.").
113 See Hamilton v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 961 F. 2d 1495, 1504 (10th
Cir. 1992) (expressing concern that summary judgment may hinder plaintiff's ability
to fully present its case).
114 368 U.S. 464 (1962).
115 Poller, 368 U.S. at 473.
116 See 391 U.S. 253, 289-90 (1968) (declining to accept the view that summary
judgment is precluded by Rule 56(e)).
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Nevertheless, the Poller ruling created some uncertainty as to the role
of summary judgment in antitrust cases. That uncertainty was exacer-
bated by the language of Rule 56 itself, which provides that summary
judgment is proper where there is "no genuine dispute as to any material
fact."' 17 What is a "genuine dispute"? How does one draw the line
delineating questions of fact from questions of law? It is also unclear
whether the moving party had the burden of proof on the summary
judgment motion and whether the quantum of proof needed at the
summary judgment stage mirrored the burden of proof at trial."i' Rather
than address these questions directly, the courts simply resolved any
doubts by denying summary judgment.119 Courts, in other words, were
reluctant to exercise the screening function embodied in Rule 56, which
was designed to eliminate cases lacking sufficient merit for a full-scale
trial. Once summary judgment has been denied, defendants facing the
uncertainties of trial had little choice but to bargain for settlement in the
shadow of the impending jury trial.
The Advisory Committee on Federal Civil Rules considered changes
to Rule 56. However, in the 1980s, "docket pressures ... prompted
dramatic revisions in federal procedure.""12 In 1986, the Supreme Court
decided Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,121
which clarified summary judgment standards and expanded the role of
summary judgment in antitrust cases.' In Matsushita, Zenith was an
American electronics manufacturer that claimed rival Japanese electron-
ics producers had conspiied to drive it from the field by engaging in
predatorypricing." 3 In a predatorypricing scenario, dominant defendants
with deep pockets sell below their costs-that is, at a loss-in the short-
"17 FED. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
18 For example, the Second Circuit ruled that summary must be denied if there is
the "slightest doubt" regarding whether the plaintiff could obtain a jury verdict.
Dolgow v. Anderson, 438 F.2d 825, 830 (2d Cir. 1970); cf Frederick Hart & Co. v.
Recordgraph Co., 169 F.2d 580, 581 (3d Cir. 1948) (finding summary judgment must
be denied where the motion is at odds with allegations of a well-pleaded complaint).
"' See, e.g., Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464,470 (2d Cir. 1946) (denying summaryjudgment to a defendant where the only "fact" issue was the defendant's credibility).
120 Issacharoff & Lowenstein, supra note 112, at 73.
121 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
122 Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 585-87.
123 Id. at 584-85.
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run to drive shallow pocket rivals from the market and thereby eliminate
competition and both earn monopoly rents and recoup short-term losses
in the long run. 1
24
Although as a matter of logic, Zenith's claim might make sense, the
Court pointed out that a predatory pricing strategy is inherently risky and
that rational sellers would be hesitant to embrace it as a plausible business
strategy, especially since for-profit companies loathe even short-term
losses.125 Accordingly, Zenith's claim came before the Court with at least
one strike against it.126 Not only was the predatory pricing claim shaky
as a matter of substantive antitrust law, the supporting evidence was weak
as well.127 Zenith's principal proof of the alleged predation scheme was
that the defendants sold their products at low prices. 128 The defendants'
low prices may very well be evidence of conspiracy, but an equally
plausible explanation is that the low prices were mTerely the product of
aggressive competition for sales. 129 Low prices clearly benefitted con-
sumers.13 ° Far from being anti-competitive, defendants' pricing practices
arguably evidenced the kind of robust price competition that the antitrust
laws seek to promote.13
To defeat the motion for summary judgment, Zenith had the burden
of adducing sufficient evidence creating "a genuine issue of material
fact."'3 2 Put another way, Zenith had to come forward with enough proof
to establish an issue about which reasonable persons could disagree.'33
The Supreme Court ruled that Zenith had failed to establish a genuine
issue of material fact.134 It held that the evidence of defendants' low
prices was at best ambiguous on the issue of conspiracy because low
124 Id. at 589.
125 Id. at 589-90.
126 See id.
127 id.
1281 d. at 578.
129 Id. at 596-97.
'
30 Id. at 594.
131 id.
132 Id. at 585-86 (quoting FED R. Civ. P. 56(e)).
133 Matsushita, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
134 Id. at 587.
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prices may also evidence competition.'35 The Court further held that
antitrust law limits the range of permissible inferences that can be drawn
from ambiguous evidence on a motion for summary judgment.'36
Conduct that is as consistent with competition as it is with conspiracy
does not, as a matter of law, create a question of fact for the jury.137 To
defeat the motion for summary judgment, it was incumbent upon Zenith
to come forward with additional evidence of conspiracy.'38 The Court
found that Zenith would have to present proof "that tends to exclude the
possibility that the alleged conspirators acted independently."'39
Accordingly, Zenith must show that "the inference of conspiracy is
reasonable in light of the competing inferences of independent action or
collusive action that could not have harmed [plaintiff]. ''14°
Without specific reference to Poller, the Court made clear that
summary judgment procedures are as appropriate in antitrust cases as in
any other area of substantive law. In companion summary judgment
rulings issued within weeks of Matsushita, the Court detailed how
summary judgment procedures, far from being at odds with the Federal
Rules, are consistent with the overall thrust of the Federal Rules that
meritorious litigants have their day in court. 4 '
In the wake of Matsushita, trial courts have not been shy about
granting summary judgment for defendants in antitrust cases. One court
has gone so far as to say that summary judgment is "particularly favored
in antitrust cases because of the concern that protracted litigation will
chill procompetitive market forces."'42 That is surely an overstatement.
Nevertheless, in the aftermath of Matsushita, the line dividing what a
I3 d. at 588.
136 Id.
137 Id. (citing Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984).
I38 ld. (citing Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 764).
39Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 764).
140 Id. (citing First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co. 391 U.S. 253, 280
(1968)).
141 See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986) (stating summary
judgment is consistent with the Federal Rules, which were created to ensure actions are
handled fairly, quickly, and inexpensively).
142 Pepsico, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 315 F.3d 101, 104 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing Tops
Mkts., Inc. v. Quality Mkts., Inc, 142 F.3d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1998).
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court may or may not do at the summary judgment stage has become
blurred. Traditionally, the court's role in summary judgment cases has
been issue spotting, not issue determination. Once the court determines
that a genuine issue of material facts exists, that issue can only be
resolved at trial.143 Matsushita did not alter this basic rule."'
Nevertheless, in the wake of Matsushita, antitrust courts routinely
decide factual issues, including market definition,145 causation, 46 antitrust
injury, 14 market power1 4 ' and conspiracy,'49 at the summary judgment
stage. Indeed, summary judgment has proven to be an effective vehicle
in keeping complex antitrust issues from the jury, while at the same time
paying lip service to the right to jury trial.
3. Daubert and the Exclusion of Expert Evidence
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,5 ' the Supreme
Court revamped the standards for admissibility of scientific and technical
evidence in federal court. The Court replaced the old "generally accepted
in the scientific community" standard with a more flexible multifactor
test designed to ensure that such evidence is both reliable and relevant
to the issues in the case.'51 The Court in Daubert also assigned district
143 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 478-79
(1992) (finding conduct to be anticompetitive on its face, which raised a genuine issue
of material fact).
144 id.
145 See, e.g., Belfiore v. New York Times Co., 826 F.2d 177, 180 (2d Cir. 1987)
(opining on contrasting market definitions).
146 See, e.g., Toscano v. PGA Tour, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1126 (E.D. Cal.
2002) (finding that the appellant had not met their burden in proving damages).
147 Pool Water Prods v. Olin Corp., 258 F.3d 1024, 1033 (9th Cir. 2001).
148 Assam Drug Co. v. Miller Brewing Co., 798 F.2d 311, 316 (8th Cir. 1986).
149 Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Sask., 203 F.3d 1028, 1043-44 (8th
Cir. 2000).
"0 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
151Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589. Factors to be taken into account include: (1) whether
the theory or technique has been, or can be, tested; (2) whether the theory or technique
has been subject to peer review; (3) the known or potential rate of error; and (4)
whether the theory or technique has general acceptance in the scientific community.
Id. at 593-94.
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courts the role as gatekeepers, tasked with keeping junk science away
from the jury.'5 2 Daubert was thus a two-edged sword. On the one hand,
Daubert made it easier for courts to entertain scientific evidence based
on cutting edge research that was reliable but without a significant track
record, such as DNA evidence.153 On the other hand, Daubert urged trial
judges to scrutinize carefully all such evidence before it got to the jury
and to exclude expert evidence that was not both relevant and reliable. 15 4
The Daubert holding was subsequently extended to all expert testi-
mony.15
5
Expert evidence, notably economic evidence, is an integral part of
most antitrust claims and defenses. '56 Pretrial rulings on the admissibility
of expert testimony can have outcome-determinative effects.157 Rejection
of proof proffered by plaintiff s expert may stop a lawsuit dead in its
tracks.158 Allowing rather than rejecting that very same expert proof may
lead a defendant to seek settlement. In either case, jury trial is avoided.
Daubert thus provides another avenue for keeping complex issues away
from the jury in antitrust cases.
4. Class Actions
The class action mechanism is a potent weapon in the arsenal of
private antitrust plaintiffs. Antitrust violations, particularly those in-
volving price-fixing, may cause only nominal damages to individual
consumers but enormous damages to consumers in the aggregate. Neither
consumers nor their attorneys would find such cases cost-effective to
litigate on an individual basis. The class action mechanism not only
makes these cases cost-efficient to pursue but also makes sure that
152 Id. at 589.
151 Id. at 593-94.
154 Id. at 589.
155 Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147-48 (1999) (Rule 702 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence applies equally to "scientific," "technical," or "other
specialized" knowledge.).
156 Christine P. Bartholomew, Death by Daubert: The Continued Attack on Private
Antitrust, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 2147, 2149-50 (2014).
... Id. at 2150.
158 Id.
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antitrust violators will not keep their ill-gotten gains simply because they
were savvy enough to take only a little bit at a time.159
Before a case can proceed as a class action, the court must certify that
the case meets the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.161 Certification is a threshold question which the court must
address "[a]t an early practicable time" in the lawsuit. 161 In some
respects, a class certification motion operates much like a summary
judgment motion. Denial of class certification in the kind of price fixing
case described above may well end a lawsuit before it even begins.
62
Granting certification also has consequences. It may lead the defendants
to seek a settlement; at the very least, it assures that the defendants will
be spending large sums of money defending the case.1
63
The Supreme Court has long held that class certification may be
granted only where "the trial court is satisfied, after rigorous analysis,
that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) are satisfied., 164 Yet the lower courts
historically have disagreed about the meaning of rigorous analysis. Some
courts, reading the Supreme Court's decision in Eisen v. Carlisle'65 as
a bar to any fact-finding at the class certification stage, have avoided
ruling on "the battle of the experts" and allowed the class claims to go
forward upon making a threshold showing that Rule 23 requirements have
been met or upon demonstration that plaintiff intends to try the case in
a manner that satisfies the requirements of Rule 23.166
"' See LAWRENCE SULLIVAN & WARREN GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN
INTEGRATED HANDBOOK § 14.6 (3d ed. 2016) ("Class actions became a significant
force because they allowed aggregation of individual claims, too small to warrant
individual plaintiffs bringing an action.").
'
60 FED. R. CIv. P. 23(c).
161 Id.
162 See Blair v. Equifax Check Servs., Inc., 181 F.3d 832, 834 (7th Cir. 1999) ("For
some cases the denial of class status sounds the death knell of the litigation.").
163 Id. ("[J]ust as a denial of class status can doom the plaintiff, so a grant of class
status can put considerable pressure on the defendant to settle, even when the plaintiff's
probability of success on the merits is slight.").
164 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350-51 (2011) (citing Gen. Tel.
Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982)).
165 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
166 See, e.g., Selzer v. Bd. of Educ., 112 F.R.D. 176, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) ("A
motion for class ratification is not the occasion for a mini-hearing on the merits.");
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This posture of deference to plaintiff's class claims is now a distinctly
minority approach.167 The majority of courts now require factual findings
supporting the decision to grant or deny class certification.168 That
process may lead district courts to confront merits issues at the class
certification stage. 69 As the Supreme Court observed in Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes: "Frequently that 'rigorous analysis' will entail
some overlap with the merits of the plaintiff's underlying claim. That
cannot be helped.""17 Failure to make such factual findings at the certi-
fication stage "flatly contradicts our cases requiring a determination that
Rule 23 is satisfied, even when that requires inquiry into the merits of
the claim." 7 ' Indeed, "[w]eighing conflicting expert testimony at the
certification stage is not only permissible, it may be integral to the
rigorous analysis that Rule 23 demands.' 72
At the same time, the Supreme Court has cautioned that even though
the mandate for rigorous analysis may involve some overlap with the
merits of plaintiff's claim, "Rule 23 grants courts no license to engage
in free-ranging merits inquiries at the certification stage."13 Merits issues
"may be considered to the extent-but only to the extent-that they are
relevant to determining whether the Rule 23 prerequisites for class
certification are satisfied.,
174
Nevertheless, the more searching inquiries now undertaken by district
courts at the certification stage have led to frequent denials of class
certification, which, in turn, have stopped consumer antitrust actions dead
in their tracks.
Caridad v. Metro N. Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 292-93 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating the
trial court may not weigh conflicting proof offered by experts or engage in statistical
dueling of experts when determining class certification).
167 See Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 ("Rule 23 does not set forth a mere pleading
standard.").
168 Id. ("A party seeking class certification must affirmatively demonstrate his
compliance with the rules-that is, he must be prepared to prove that there are in fact
sufficiently numerous parties, common questions of law or fact.. .
169 See id.
170 564 U.S. 338, 351 (2011).
"71 Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1433 (2013) (citation omitted).
172 In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 323 (3d Cir. 2008).
173 Amgen Inc., v. Conn. Retirement Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1194-95
(2013).
1
14 Id. at 1195.
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D. Alternative Tribunals
Some critics of the civil jury in antitrust cases have suggested that it
would be preferable for private suits to be heard by specialized tribunals
rather than by generalist judges or randomly selected juries.175 In addition
to eliminating concerns about incompetent juries, this plan has the
additional virtue of bringing the United States more in line with vast bulk
of industrialized countries that have implemented antitrust enforcement
regimes. However, any transition to this type of model in private actions
would require an act of Congress. The likelihood that Congress would
undertake such a drastic revision of the private antitrust remedy after
more than a century under the Sherman Act seems remote. Even if
Congress were to act, there would be significant uncertainty whether a
specialized tribunal would be an improvement over the present system.
Such a regime would likely be more efficient and perhaps more predict-
able, but may sacrifice "societal values deeply rooted in our notions of
democracy-values which require that factual decisions affecting the life,
liberty, and property of litigants should, at least at their option, be made
by a cross section of the community, [i].e., a jury of their peers. ' 76
Among these values is the individual treatment of individual cases.
Administrative agencies, like courts in bench trials, must engage in
extensive fact-finding to support their decisions. Justice, on an individual
basis, may take a back seat to broader goals of predictability and con-
sistency. Juries, on the other hand, are not required to disclose findings
of fact. Rather, they operate in what Judge Becker termed the "black
box," reaching a verdict without explanation as to how they got there.
177
Juries are thus better positioned than public authorities to do justice on
a case-by-case basis.178
175 See Crane, supra note 15, at 34 ("Antitrust experts frequently bemoan the
substitution of juries for regulators and criticize juries as unsuited to determining
complex antitrust matters.").
176 Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 478 F. Supp. 889, 938 (E.D.
Pa. 1979), rev 'd on other grounds, In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631
F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980).
171 Id. ("The 'black box' jury allows our courts to deliver individualized justice to
do 'equity' without sacrificing our expressed devotion to the uniform rule of law."); see
Sperlich, supra note 8, at 414 ("A viable system of justice ... requires individual-
ization ofjustice as well as uniformity.").
78 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 631 F. Supp. at 938.
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A less radical, but still controversial alternative, would be empaneling
specialized juries, qualified by educational background, job experience,
and professional skills to hear complex antitrust cases. The concept is
not new and is similar to the "Blue Ribbon" jury approach that some
jurisdictions experimented with a generation ago.179 On its face, this
proposal has some visceral appeal. A specially qualified blue ribbonjury
would probably be better able to comprehend complex antitrust issues
than ajury drawn from the general population. However, the special jury
concept would seem to run afoul of the Federal Jury Selection and
Services Act of 1968,180 which requires that jurors be selected randomly
from a cross-section of those in the juror pools. 81 The special jury
approach also has practical problems. It is an elitist concept that is at
odds with a jury system built on egalitarian principles. Also, those
deemed qualified to sit on blue ribbon juries may not be interested in
serving on ajury in a complex antitrust case where the opportunity costs
are high and the rewards low. Yet, these factors may not prove fatal to
the special jury. Where the parties consent, a court may empanel a
special jury and go forward on a "don't ask, don't tell" basis.182
From the foregoing discussion, two conclusions emerge. First, the
jury is here to stay in private antitrust actions. Second, the proposed
alternatives to the current jury system, even if desirable to some extent,
face legal and practical hurdles so severe that they cannot be reasonably
viewed as viable alternatives to the current system. In short, the best
action is to find ways to improve the operation of the jury in complex
litigation.
II. Handling Complexity Under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Without a doubt, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have introduced
procedures that have served to make federal actions more complicated,
179 See Sperlich, supra note 8, at 416.
180 28 U.S.C.A § 1867 (West 1968).
's' 28 U.S.C.A § 1863(b)(2) (West 1968); see Sperlich, supra note 8, at 416.
182 See Grady, supra note 29, at 250.
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including compulsory counterclaims,'83 joinder of claims,'84 joinder of
parties,'85 intervention,'8 6 class actions, 187 and liberal pretrial discovery. 88
However, the Federal Rules have also provided the courts and litigants
with the management tools to distill and ultimately simplify issues for
trial. Judicious use of these tools is critical to improved jury perfor-
mance.
A. Pretrial Management
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure confer on trial judges significant
managerial powers designed to narrow issues, control the amount and
cost of discovery, limit delays, and push the case toward trial. Rule 16
confers broad powers on the district courts to manage every aspect of the
litigation. 189
In antitrust cases especially, the trial court must have a firm grasp on
the issues before it. Notice pleading, even in the era since Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, allows claims to be stated in broad, general terms. 9°
It is therefore critical for the court to intervene early in order to separate
the wheat from the chaff and to ascertain precisely the claims and
defenses that the parties are asserting."' Without judicial management,
the issues will grow, and discovery with respect to those issues will
quickly spin out of control.'92 In this regard, the court may find it useful
to request the parties to submit preliminary jury instructions that identify
183 FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a).
184 FED. R. CIV. P. 18.
185 FED. R. Civ. P. 19-20.
"
6 FED. R. Crv. P. 24.
187 FED. R. CIv. P. 23.
188 FED. R. Civ. P. 26, 30-36.
189 FED. R. CIv. P. 16.
190 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007).
191 See William W. Schwarzer, Reforming Jury Trials, 132 F.R.D. 575, 577 (1991)
("Judges serve a critical function in complex litigation by identifying and defining the
issues that need to be tried.").
192 See id. (noting the importance of pretrial issue management in controlling the
costs and burdens of a trial).
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the issues actually in play.193 Only when the court knows the real issues
can the scope of discovery be ascertained.194
Rule 16(b) requires that the parties submit a discovery plan and that
the court approve the plan before discovery can go forward.195 Before
approving the plan, the court must decide the appropriate limitations to
be imposed on discovery. 19 6 Parties are not entitled to unlimited dis-
covery; rather, discovery must be proportional to the needs of the case. 197
To this end, courts may impose specific limitations on the number of
interrogatories,198 and the number 99 and length of depositions."' The
Federal Rules also encourage the courts to determine the scope of
electronic discovery and whether any cost-shifting is appropriate in that
e-discovery process at an early stage.2"1
The Federal Rules authorize management of the pretrial phase of the
case; they do not require it.202 Federal judges vary in their comfort levels
with active case management. Some judges prefer to leave the discovery
process to the attorneys.2 3 However, active management is imperative
in complex antitrust cases. Without active judicial supervision in the
discoveryphase, issues for trial will accumulate and necessarily compli-
cate proceedings. 4 Active management is essential to ensure that the
fact finder is not overwhelmed at trial and that discovery costs do not
spiral out of control.20 5
19 3Id. at 578.
194 id.
195 FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b).
196 id.
197 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
198 FED. R. Crv. P. 33(a)(1).
199 FED. R. CI. P. 30(a)(2)(A)(i).
200 FED. R. CIv. P. 30(d)(1).
201 FED. R. CIrv. P. 34(b).
202 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
203 See Schwarzer, supra note 191, at 577.
204 See id.
205 See id. at 575 ("Much of [a case's] complexity is the product of lawyers' work-
excessive discovery and the proliferation of evidence and issues-and judges passivity
and permissiveness.").
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Equally important is the need for the court to set time limits for the
conduct and completion of discovery and the beginning of trial.2 °6 Arthur
Miller once described discovery as a dance marathon where the litigants
sought to hold on to each other until they collapsed.20 7 Clearly, the longer
discovery goes on, the more expensive the litigation. The court must also
set firm dates from entertaining motions to dismiss and motions for
summary judgment. In the wake of Twombly, motions to dismiss are
routine in antitrust cases. Similarly, afterMatsushita, summary judgment
motions have been a fixture on the pretrial agenda. In some cases, of
course, these motions will be dispositive and the cases dismissed. But,
even where the motions are denied, they can be important vehicles for
narrowing and focusing the issues for trial.
B. Trial Management
Planning the trial phase of the case is as important, if not more
important, as planning the pretrial phase. Key elements in the trial plan
include establishing the number of trial days208 and limiting the number
of witnesses for trial.209 In addition, the court must identify the issues
to be tried and establish the order of trial.210 In this regard, the court
should consider the merits of bifurcating issues for trial, typically whether
to try liability issues first and leave damages for the second phase of trial.
The court can also employ a number of devices to assist the jury in
understanding the case. The Manual for Complex Litigation identifies
a variety of techniques that courts can use to help thejury. Courts should
also take advantage of technology to assist juries in hearing the case and
understanding the evidence. Among other things, the court should
consider the following devices or procedures.
206 FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b); see MANUALFOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 11.422(4th ed.
2004) (explaining the pros and cons of establishing time limits on the discovery
process, such as a "discovery cutoff date").
207 MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: How THE CRISIS IN THE
LEGAL PROFESSION IS TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY 56 (1st ed. 1996).
208 Schwarzer, supra note 191, at 578-79; MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION,
supra note 206, § 12.11.
209 Schwarzer, supra note 191, at 578-79.
21 Id. at 577-78.
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1. Preliminary Instructions to the Jury
Lay jurors might benefit from a preliminary set of instructions on
antitrust laws, providing context for the proof they will hear at trial.211
Obviously, these preliminary instructions need not be as detailed as the
final instructions given after the close of proof, and the jury should be
advised that the court will provide detailed instructions on the law at an
appropriate point in the trial.
2. Glossaries
Providing the jury with a glossary of technical or unfamiliar terms can
be useful to the jury in understanding the proof as the case unfolds.212
3. Exhibit Books
Each juror should be provided a copy of all exhibits to be used at
trial. 213 That way, the jurors can focus their full attention on a particular
document when it is being discussed and not be distracted as they would
if a single exhibit were passed from juror to juror.
4. Note Taking
Jurors should be permitted to take notes. 214 Note taking has been tra-
ditionally banned out of fear that jurors will make mistakes in preparing
notes and that such mistakes will infect deliberations and ultimately the
verdict itself.215 This argument is not compelling. Imagine if law
211 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 206, § 12.432.
212 Id. § 12.31.
213 See Schwarzer, supra note 191, at 589.
214 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 206, § 12.421 ("Many jurors
will not take notes, but denial of permission to do so may be inconsistent with the large
measure of responsibility the system places on jurors, and it may hamper their
performance."); see Schwarzer, supra note 191, at 590-91 ("Although long dis-
couraged, note-taking has now become widely accepted.").
215 See Schwarzer, supra note 191, at 592 (noting the stance against juror note
taking, but arguing "[i]t seems more likely, however, that a juror who takes notes will
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students were prohibited from taking notes in class and then expected to
pass an examination based on class discussion throughout the term. That
would be intolerable, and banning jurors from taking notes is equally
intolerable. It may well be that some jurors may get it wrong in their
notes, but the likelihood of error is far. greater if jurors are barred from
taking notes altogether.
5. Questions from the Jurors
Jurors should be permitted to ask questions of a witness. These
questions can be screened by the judge, who then can put the question
to the witness if appropriate." 6
6. Visual Aids
The court should encourage the parties to use visual aids, such as
PowerPoint slides, whenever possible." 7 Charts and data summaries may
also assist the jury in digesting the evidence. 8 Where the parties seek
to introduce deposition testimony at trial, videotape from the deposition
(if available) should be used.219 Listening to deposition excerpts being
read into the record is a deathly boring exercise for the jury. Use of
videotape allows the jury to see the witnesses as they testified on
deposition and enables the jury more accurately to assess demeanor and
credibility.22 ° Moreover, jurors, more accustomed to television screens,
be forced to concentrate and try to understand what he hears, and that his notes will
help him remember the evidence").
216 SeeMANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 206, § 12.423 (Judges vary
widely on whether to allow jurors to ask questions of the witness, and the jury should
be advised that the issue may be covered in subsequent testimony or maybe
inadmissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence.).
217 See Schwarzer, supra note 191, at 588-89 (Visual aids serve the dual purpose of
providing added meaning to evidence and saving time.).
218 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 206, § 12.31; Schwarzer, supra
note 191, at 588.
219 Schwarzer, supra note 191, at 588.
220 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 206, § 12.333 ("Videotape is
generally more effective for the presentation of deposition testimony, for impeachment
and rebuttal, and for reference during argument."); Schwarzer, supra note 191, at 588.
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are more apt to pay attention to the television than the "witness" reading
the deposition excerpts.221
7. Witness Introduction
Jurors may benefit from a short introduction of the witnesses prior to
their testimony. Counsel can explain to the jury who the witness is and
what the witness's testimony is designed to accomplish.222 The jury can
then decide after hearing the testimony whether counsel has achieved its
stated purpose. Of course, counsel's statement of purpose is not testi-
mony and should not be treated as such by the jury.
8. Periodic Summations
Jurors may also benefit from intermediate summation by counsel. 3
Instead of waiting for one final summation at the end of trial, the court
could permit counsel to summarize from time to time as the trial proceeds
what it believes has been proven. Again, the jury is the ultimate judge
as to whether counsel has in fact sustained its arguments with factual
proof.
9. Minimization of Distractions
The court should take steps to minimize distractions for the jury.224
Evidentiary objections can be bewildering for lay jurors. Evidentiary
issues are best handled through motions in limine prior to trial, and
rulings on these motions should not be revisited during trial. Similarly,
side bar conferences are distracting to jurors and may cause them to lose
focus. Side bars should be kept to a minimum during trial. Additionally,
221 Schwarzer, supra note 191, at 588 ("Videotapes are particularly effective
because jurors are accustomed to acquiring information from the television screen and
thus react favorably to video presentation.").
2
. Id. at 595-96.
223 Id.
224 See Grady, supra note 29, at 258 (expressing the importance of certain pretrial
practices, such as premarking exhibits, in order to streamline a trial and keep the jury
focused); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 206, § 12.15 (finding that
scheduling a conference between the judge and counsel at the end of each trial day may
"avoid bench conferences and other trial interruptions").
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the court should plan the trial so as to minimize down time for the jury.
The court should always have a Plan B for a given trial day so that the
jury does not have to be dismissed for the day because a scheduled
witness is suddenly unavailable.
10. Jury Instructions
Instructions to the jury should be presented in a clear and concise
manner. 25 Instructions should be accompanied by interrogatories to the
jury pursuant to Rule 49 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.226
Interrogatories provide not only a check on the jury but also a roadmap
that facilitates deliberations by providing the jurors with a starting
point.
7
11. Facilitation of Jury Deliberations
In addition to using interrogatories, the court can facilitate jury
deliberations by permitting the jury full access to the trial transcript,
exhibits and the jury instructions throughout the deliberation process.228
It makes no sense to keep the trial transcript out of the jury's hands and
force them to request re-reading of specified portions of trial testimony.
Much time goes to waste when jurors are trooped back into the court
room to hear testimony re-read. Why not permit them to play with a full
deck throughout the deliberations process?
Additionally, the ban on conversations among jurors about the case
prior to final submission by the court to the jury should be eased.229
Periodic discussion among jurors in the privacy of the jury room prior
225 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 206, § 12.431 ("A complex and
protracted trial makes understandable jury instructions particularly important.");
Schwarzer, supra note 191, at 582.
226 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 206, § 12.451 (Interrogatories
"simplify instructions, help jurors organize their deliberations, facilitate partial verdicts,
isolate issues for possible appellate review, and reduce the costs and burdens of
retrial.").
227 Id.
228 Grady, supra note 29, at 257.
229 Schwarzer, supra note 191, at 593-94.
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to final submission may facilitate rather than infect the fact-finding
process.23 °
12. Rule 50
Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure empowers the court
to direct a verdict where a plaintiff has failed to make out a prima facie
case and to set aside ajury verdict where that verdict is not supported by
record evidence. 231' Rule 50 provides a necessary check on the runaway
jury, and courts should not hesitate to invoke this provision where
appropriate.
13. Rule 59
Closely related to Rule 50, Rule 59 invests the court with broad power
to grant a new trial.232 For example, a new trial may be granted where
the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. In this instance, courts
may invoke remittitur, a procedure through which the plaintiff agrees to
accept an amount less than the verdict award in lieu of a new trial on
damages, to police excess damage awards by the jury. Some courts are
reluctant to set aside jury findings under Rule 59 out of fear that any such
action might be viewed as interfering with the right to trial byjury. That
is clearly not the case. Rule 59 is intended to police verdicts that should
not stand, and courts should not hesitate to utilize it properly.
C. Benefits of the Jury Trial
The foregoing discussion has focused on what the courts and litigants
can do to improve jury performance. Not to be overlooked is the fact that
having a jury at the end of the process can improve performance by
litigants and their counsel.
230 id.
231 FED. R. CiV. P. 50(b).
132 FED. R. Civ. P. 59(a).
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1. Improving Performance of Counsel
Where the jury sits as fact finder, the lawyers at the outset must think
through their respective cases from beginning to end.233 Attorneys must
focus the jury's attention on the key facts and eliminate the noise.
However complex the underlying facts, counsel must reduce their
presentations to the lowest common denominator so that the jurors are
fed with bite-sized morsels ofproof.2 4 The jury thus imposes a discipline
on counsel that benefits them, as well as the court, and ultimately the
parties in the case.235
2. The Importance of Process
Juries in antitrust cases provide the litigants with fair process.236 A
hallmark of our federal civil justice system is that disputes will be
resolved through trials held in open court based on the evidence.237
Judgments entered by trial courts are then subject to appellate review.
This is as true in antitrust cases as in any other field of law, whether torts,
contracts, securities or civil rights. Adherence to this process is what
guarantees the legitimacy of court decisions and ultimately their
acceptance by the public. Diminishing the role of the jury in antitrust
cases would unfortunately contribute to what Professors First and Waller
have aptly described as antitrust's "democracy deficit." '238 As First and
233 Higginbotham, supra note 34, at 54 ("The process of distilling complex material
into a comprehensible form operates less effectively in bench trials than in jury trials.
Although the rules of evidence purport to discipline an advocate's presentation, they
are generally only loosely followed in bench trials, on the assumption that the trial
judge will consider only admissible evidence .... Trial to a jury imposes a fierce
discipline on the advocates. The virtue of forcing counsel to organize a complex mass
of information into a form understandable by the uninitiated is that counsel ultimately
must understand the issues and evidence in the case well enough to teach. If counsel
cannot comprehensibly present their case to lay persons, is it likely that counsel do, in
fact, understand the case?").
234 id.
235 id.
236 Zenith Radio Corp. v. Ma tsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 478 F. Supp. 889, 938 (E.D.
Pa. 1979), rev'don other grounds, 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980)
237 Id.
238 Harry First & Spencer Waller, Antitrust's Democracy Deficit, 81 FORDHAM L.
REv. 2543, 2552 (2013) ("Juries help democratize antitrust.").
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Waller observe, "[p]ublic and private antitrust enforcement were set up
to enforce the law in a way that would advance democratic goals-to deal
with concentrations of economic power and to police business behavior
that exploited consumers and excluded competitors." '239 Lay jurors,
serving as fact finders, promote the democratic goals established by
Congress. 2 40 Juries are accountable to the trial courts who are in turn
accountable to appellate bodies. Taking fact finding away from juries
and leaving that task to "unaccountable and nontransparent technocratic
institutions far removed from democratic (or national) control," as some
have advocated, would clearly serve to undermine the democratic goals
of antitrust.2
41
3. Constraining the Courts
As Judge Becker observed, "[tlhe jury also provides a needed check
on judicial power" at both the trial and appellate level.2 42 At the trial
level, the jury functioning in its assigned role of fact finder directly limits
the trial judge to matters of law.243 The jury also limits the powers of the
appellate courts.244 Under the Seventh Amendment, a jury's factual
findings are not subject to appellate review.245 Judicial findings of fact
following a bench trial are subject to appellate scrutiny under a "clearly
erroneous" standard.2 46 Thus, judgments are more carefully examined
than verdicts.2 47 Abolition of the jury in complex cases would thus
enhance the powers of judges at both the trial and appellate levels.2 48
239 Id. at 2573.
240 Id. at 2552, 2573.
241 Id. at 2545.
242 Zenith, 478 F. Supp. at 942.
243 See id.
244 Id.
24' The second clause of the Seventh Amendment provides in relevant part that "no
fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States,
than according to the rules of the common law." U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
246 FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6).
247 Zenith, 478 F. Supp. at 942.
248 Id. (citing Higginbotham, supra note 34, at 58).
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Nor can it be said that a jury's role in complex antitrust cases is any
less important than its role in run-of-the-mill fender-bender cases.249 Jury
verdicts offer the courts "a contemporaneous expression of the commu-
nity values that bear on the issues in each case. 25 ° To deny litigants
access to a jury merely because the issues involved are complex would
deny the courts a window into community values and thus undermine the
quality of justice."' Moreover, precisely because the jury offers this
community insight, jury participation in the legal process serves to
legitimize the judicial decision making process, 212 which, in turn, both
reinforces the rule of law and promotes the acceptance of court rulings. 3
Conclusion
The constitutional right to a jury trial is sacred and has been carefully
guarded by the courts throughout the history of our democratic republic.
Critics of the jury trial in complex antitrust cases may well be correct that
cases of this kind pose challenges to the judicial system. Their knee-jerk
default solution--eliminate the jury as fact finder in favor of the judge-
offers few, if any, tangible benefits at the risk of imperiling public
acceptance ofjudicial outcomes specifically and the role of law generally.
The solution lies in improving the jury trial, not in abolishing it.
249 id.
20 Higginbotham, supra note 34, at 58.
251 See id.
252 Sperlich, supra note 8, at 415 (quoting In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust
Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1093 (3d Cir. 1980) (Gibbons, J., dissenting)).
253 Id. (quoting Higginbotham, supra note 34, at 59).
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